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Abstract 
It is widely accepted that the right to a fair trial is one of the most important guarantees 
contained within our legal system. That right is undermined when a jury member 
conducts his or her own research into a case. This type of juror misconduct constitutes 
contempt of court. In the light of the fact that the law of contempt is currently the subject 
of review in a number of jurisdictions, this paper considers how the law of contempt 
could be adapted to better manage the risk of jurors undertaking independent research. 
After a discussion of the current law and some problems with it, particularly those 
created by modern communications technology, this paper considers a number of 
possible reform options. It makes two broad recommendations. First, that the law should 
focus relatively more on preventing jurors undertaking their own research than on 
limiting publication. Second, that independent research by jurors should be the subject of 
statutory criminalisation, and a range of measures should be adopted to increase jurors’ 
understanding of the importance of not going outside the evidence before them and to 
minimize any incentives for jurors to conduct their own research.  
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 Introduction 
 
The Celebrated English Judge, Lord Diplock, has said that there are three requirements 
for the due administration of justice:1 
 
...first that all citizens should have unhindered access to the constitutionally-established 
courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their legal rights 
and liabilities; secondly, that they should be able to rely on upon obtaining in the courts the 
arbitrament of a tribunal which is free from bias against any party and whose decision will be 
based upon those facts only that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in 
accordance with the procedure adopted in courts of law; and thirdly that, once the dispute has 
been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely upon there being no usurpation 
by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to the law. Conduct 
which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public 
confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court. 
 
The courts have developed the contempt jurisdiction to protect against this type of 
conduct. However, the efficacy of the law has come to be questioned in light of cases 
where jurors have relied on a ouija board to determine an accused’s guilt,2 where social 
media users have published information that was subject to suppression orders or jurors 
have posted information about the trial on social media,3 and where instances of jurors 
conducting their own research on the Internet into the cases they are deciding are 
becoming more commonplace.4 All of this conduct is probably prohibited by the 
contempt jurisdiction.  
 
The offence of contempt of court conflicts with the freedom of expression.5 It limits 
individuals’ ability to impart information pertaining to a trial and to seek or receive 
information about elements of a trial. In this paper, I consider whether such restrictions 
  
1  Attorney-General v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273 at 302. 
2  R v Young [1995] QB 324. 
3  See, for example, Sam Greenhill “Peaches Geldof faces criminal probe after tweeting names of mothers 
who helped Lost Prophets paedophile abuse their babies” The Daily Mail (online ed, London, 28 
November 2013); Attorney-General v Beard [2013] EWHC 2317 (Admin) [2013] All ER (D) 391. 
4  See, for example, R v Bates [1985] 1 NZLR 326 (CA); R v Harris CA121/06, 27 September 2006. 
5  See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
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are justified, as well as how the law of contempt could be improved. I make two major 
propositions: first, that there should be a greater focus on limiting illegitimate juror 
research, in favour of greater publication freedom; and secondly, that juror research 
should be made into a statutory offence, accompanied by educative measures such as 
stronger jury directions regarding the importance of not undertaking their own research. I 
also recommend that elements of trial procedure are adapted to minimise incentives for 
jurors to undertake their own research.  
 
In Part II I explain the relationship between the law of contempt and two important rights: 
the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression. I note that the right to 
freedom of expression does not necessarily conflict with the right to a fair trial, and that 
in many cases it can complement and enhance access to justice. However, for the most 
part, my paper addresses situations where these two rights conflict - and where the 
contempt jurisdiction is most relevant. I focus on the two types of contempt that are 
aimed at limiting the risk of jurors making decisions based on prejudicial information that 
is not in evidence: publication contempt, and jurors undertaking independent research 
into the case they are deciding. I consider whether it is justified to limit the right to 
freedom of expression in these instances, concluding that in some situations it will be 
preferable to limit temporarily the freedom of expression rights of some person or 
persons in order to preserve the right to a fair trial and to uphold public confidence in the 
administration of justice.  
 
In Part III I examine some problems the contempt jurisdiction faces in the modern era. I 
explain how modern technology makes it increasingly difficult to strike an appropriate 
balance between these rights, and suggest that the law of contempt needs to be revised in 
order to meet these challenges. While there are few reported cases of New Zealand jurors 
undertaking independent research, such conduct is a growing concern overseas and it is 
important that our laws are equipped to deal with it.6 I also consider the common law test 
for contempt - that an action which poses a “real risk” to the administration of justice will 
  
6  See, for example, Attorney-General v Fraill and Sewart [2011] EWCA Crim 1570 at [29]. 
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constitute a contempt of court7 - and argue that it constitutes too vague a limit on the right 
to freedom of expression.  
 
I move in Part IV to discussing some options for reform. My analysis focuses on two key 
issues: whether an option is likely to be effective in preventing prejudice to fair trial 
rights; and whether an option constitutes a justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of 
expression. I employ the Oakes8 test, as applied in Hansen v R,9 in assessing whether 
such limitations are justified. I consider delays or changes of venue; routine and longer-
term sequestration; greater use of challenges and juror vetting; improving the quality and 
consistency of jury directions; amending the juror oath; increasing the ability of jurors to 
participate and to use information technology during a trial; judge-alone trials; and 
statutory criminalisation of juror research. 
 
I recommend, in Part V, that a combination of measures is most appropriate and likely to 
be most effective. In particular, I suggest that codification of offences, as well as 
educative options such as improving jury directions to make jurors more aware of the 
contempt jurisdiction and its importance, is likely to be most appropriate and effective. I 
argue that it may be more palatable, from a freedom of expression perspective, to focus 
more on preventing jurors from accessing information, than on limiting publication. This 
is an issue that is under-developed in the current literature. Focusing more on juror 
misconduct will allow publishers to impart information, and members of the general 
public to seek and receive information, about a trial or an accused, without causing 
prejudice to the jury pool. One issue that remains is that publications before the jury is 
empanelled may still have a prejudicial effect, so I argue that some restrictions on 
publication are also necessary.  However, it is impossible to insulate the jury pool from 
all publicity relating to a trial, especially for high profile trials. The most the law can do is 
attempt to mitigate any undue prejudicial effect on potential jurors.  
 
  
7  Television New Zealand v Solicitor-General [1989] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
8  R v Oakes [1986] SCR 103. 
9  [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC). 
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 Contempt of Court: The Conflict between the Right to a Fair Trial and 
the Freedom of  Expression 
 
In this part of the paper, I explain the rationale for the offence of contempt of court and 
explore the relationship between the right to freedom of expression, and the goal of 
protecting the right to a fair trial. I also examine how the contempt jurisdict ion functions 
in New Zealand, looking at procedure as well as the key elements of the offence. Finally, 
I consider whether the current approach to limiting the right to freedom of expression 
where it conflicts with the right to a fair trial is justified.  
A The Purpose of the Law of Contempt of Court 
 
The contempt jurisdiction exists to uphold the rule of law,10 by criminalising conduct that 
undermines the administration of justice, or inhibits citizens from availing themselves of 
the legal system.11 Lord Diplock’s statement of the three fundamental requirements for 
the administration of justice has been adopted by the New Zealand Courts in Solicitor-
General v Smith.12 However, it is not always the case that conduct must be “calculated” 
to prejudice any of these requirements in order to constitute contempt of court in New 
Zealand; the offence is strict liability in nature.  This will be discussed further below.  
 
There are two key harms that come from contemptuous conduct. The first is harm to a 
particular trial in the context of which the conduct occurs. There is a risk that if 
prohibited conduct, such as publication of prejudicial information, or jurors undertaking 
their own research into the case before them, occurs, then the accused in that case is not 
receiving a fair trial. Where jurors access information that is unfairly prejudicial to an 
accused, they may have illegitimate perceptions of guilt, which also breaches the 
presumption of innocence. It is of fundamental importance in our criminal justice system 
  
10  David Eady and ATH Smith Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2003) at 55. 
11  Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48 (HC) at 53. 
12  See Solicitor-General v Smith [2004] 2 NZLR 540 (HC). 
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that people are “tried by the courts, not by the Internet.”13 This is for several reasons, the 
first of these being that all evidence should be subjected to examination and challenge by 
both the prosecution and the defendant, usually through their counsel.14 Another reason is 
that trials should take place in public and all material relevant to the outcome should be 
known: everyone has the right to be tried solely according to evidence properly placed 
before a court.15 The right to a fair trial, including the right to be presumed innocent, is 
protected by s 25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which provides that: 
 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of the charge, 
the following minimum rights: 
(a) The right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court: 
... 
(c) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law. 
 
The second major harm is that contemptuous conduct undermines public confidence in 
the administration of justice. Public confidence in a particular verdict may be 
undermined, as may confidence in the jury system in general.  
B Relationship with the Right to Freedom of Expression 
 
Limiting conduct that may interfere with any of Lord Diplock’s three requirements may 
have an impact on a large number of activities. For example, publication of prejudicial 
information, adverse comment on the court or judicial process, certain types of behaviour 
before the court, disobeying court orders, inappropriate seeking of information by 
participants in a trial, and disclosure of certain information about the trial process, are all 
types of conduct that may constitute a contempt of court. In this paper, I focus on the two 
forms of contempt that are aimed at preserving Lord Diplock’s second requirement: the 
right of citizens to access a decision that is free from bias and based upon only those facts 
that have been proved in evidence. These are publication contempt and juror misconduct 
  
13  (24 February 2014) 576 GBPD HC 55. 
14  ATH Smith “Reforming the New Zealand Law of Contempt of Court: An Issues/Discussion Paper” 
(discussion paper presented to the Hon C Finalyson, Attorney-General, 18 April 2011) at 41. 
15   At 41; Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd [1978] 1 NZLR 225 (CA) at 233. 
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through independent research. In this section I consider the degree to which these specific 
forms of contempt limit the right to freedom of expression. 
 
A prohibition on publication of certain information clearly conflicts with the right to 
impart information, a key element of the freedom of expression.16 Freedom of expression 
is protected by s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, and includes the right to “seek, receive, and 
impart information of any kind and in any form”. “Expression” has been described as 
being “as wide as human thought and imagination.”17 The type of information that is 
prohibited from being published is any that creates a “real risk” that publication of the 
information would be prejudicial to the fairness of a criminal trial.18 Such information 
includes offending history, prior guilty pleas, or details that go to a crucial element of the 
case, such as publishing a photograph where identification is in question.19 Importantly, 
as explained in more detail below, in New Zealand it is not necessary, in order to 
constitute contempt, for the publication to actually have any effect on the trial process – 
the act of publishing information that could have a prejudicial effect is sufficient.20  
 
This conflicts with the idea that the ability of the media to report on court proceedings is 
important, “not only to the rights of those involved in judicial proceedings to a fair trial, 
but also to the wider public, which has a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of 
the judicial system.”21 It is important to note that freedom of expression is not necessarily 
and certainly not always in conflict with the right to a fair trial. Indeed, it is seen as 
fundamental to our justice system that proceedings are held in an open court, where the 
  
16  See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
17  Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
18  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a); Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd, above n 15, at 233. 
19  Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General [1995] 3 NZLR 563 (CA) at 571; R v Smail [2009] NZCA 143 
(CA) at [18]; Attorney-General v Tonks [1934] NZLR 141 (SC, Wellington) at 146; See also Law 
Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendant’s Previous Convictions, Similar Offending and Bad 
Character (NZLC R103, June 2008); Smith, above n 14, at 25. 
20  Law Commission Contempt in Modern New Zealand (NZLC, IP36, May 2014) at [4.10]; Solicitor-
General v TV3 Network Services (1998) 16 CRNZ 401 (HC) at 410.  
21  Grant Huscroft, “Freedom of Expression” in Paul Rishworth (ed) The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) at 336. 
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media and the general public can be privy to all important aspects of the proceeding.22 
Lord Diplock explained this in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd:23 
 
If the way that courts behave cannot be hidden from the public ear and eye this provides a 
safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncracy and maintains the public confidence in 
the administration of justice. The application of this principle of open justice has two aspects: 
as respects proceedings in the court itself it requires that they should be held in open court to 
which the press and public are admitted and that, in criminal cases at any rate, all evidence 
communicated to the court is communicated publicly. As respects the publication to a wider 
public of fair and accurate reports of proceedings that have taken place in court the principle 
requires that nothing should be done to discourage this. 
 
In Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General, Richardson J noted 
that this principle of open justice is of particular importance in criminal proceedings, 
“where individual liberty is at stake.”24 
 
While freedom of the press is not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights Act, the 
courts have acknowledged that it is obviously an important aspect of the right to freedom 
of expression.25 Freedom of the press covers “not only the right of the press to impart 
information of general interest or concern, but also the right of the public to receive it.”26 
Therefore any judicial interference with press freedom or with the principles of open 
justice ought not to be taken lightly. 
 
Huscroft argues that the law of contempt has a “chilling effect” on the freedom of 
expression because of its uncertain scope, and that “the only way to be sure of avoiding a 
problem, then, is to limit one’s expression to a greater extent than may be necessary.”27 
The practical consequence of this chilling effect may be that the media are reluctant to 
report on details of trials or accused persons at all, thus limiting the community’s ability 
  
22  See Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417.  
23  [1979] AC 440 at 449-450 per Lord Diplock. 
24  [1982] 1 NZLR 120 at 132. 
25  Huscroft, above n 21, at 334; Auckland Area Health Board v Television New Zealand Ltd [1992] 3 
NZLR 406 (CA); Television New Zealand Ltd v Attorney-General [1995] 2 NZLR 641 (CA). 
26  Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1981] 2 WLR 848 at 865. 
27  Huscroft, above n 21, at 343. 
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to receive information about crime. This may result in the public receiving only part of a 
story, or accessing information from inaccurate sources. It may also result in negative 
perceptions of the justice process. The public are less likely to accept the authority of 
judges’ decisions if they perceive that they don’t have access to information about the 
courts.28 Further, if there was information that some members of the public considered 
was particularly relevant to their community or to the safety of some members of the 
community, and they did not receive that information until after the trial had concluded, 
that might have a serious and negative impact on their confidence in the criminal justice 
process. 
 
There are certain circumstances where it is recognised that the freedom of the press, and 
the freedom of expression of other actors, such as jurors, can justifiably be restricted in 
order to protect the right of an accused to a fair trial by an impartial arbiter, or to protect 
the administration of justice more generally. For example, conducting certain hearings or 
allowing certain witnesses to give evidence in closed court, from which the media and 
general public are excluded, is considered justifiable in protecting the administration of 
justice and fairness to parties in cases of a particular nature, usually family proceedings or 
cases involving complaints of sexual violence.29 However, the question of whether the 
law of contempt of court in New Zealand strikes the appropriate balance between the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial remains open. The next section 
of this paper raises some contemporary issues with the law and considers this question in 
more detail.  
 
The second form of contempt on which this paper focuses is a type of juror misconduct. 
Where a juror undertakes his or her own research into an element of a case, this conflicts 
with the principle that trials should take place in public and that all material relevant to 
the outcome is known.30 It also undermines the notion that all evidence should be 
  
28  Peter Carey and others Media Law (5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010) at 179; see also Law 
Reform Commission of Canada Contempt of Court (R17, 1982) at 13. 
29   Andrew Nicol and Geoffrey Robertson Robertson and Nicol on Media Law (5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2007) at 464. 
30  Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.19]. 
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subjected to examination and challenge by both the prosecution and the defendant.31 
However, preventing independent research limits jurors’ rights to seek and receive 
information, another important part of the freedom of expression.32 The law currently is 
unclear, but it would seem that accessing any information that is relevant to the parties, 
counsel, judge, or issues in the case, or to the trial process generally, is prohibited. This is 
a substantial limitation on the types of information which jurors may seek and receive. 
However, there is little literature on this; this may be because it has only become a major 
issue relatively recently, so there is limited case law; it may be that it is such an inherent 
part of the juror oath, to try the case only on the evidence, that we do not consider it 
questionable; or it may be that we choose to focus on publication contempt in order to 
limit the amount of information available to jurors, so that even if a juror did conduct a 
search on the Internet, for example, they would not find anything seriously prejudicial to 
the case.  
 
The extent to which this type of juror misconduct occurs is unclear. This is, in part, 
because jury deliberations are secret, subject to very limited exceptions,33 and also 
because it is difficult to detect when a juror may have conducted their own research. This 
is particularly so where a juror has used a personal electronic device to conduct research 
on the Internet. However, there are reported cases in New Zealand where jurors have 
visited a crime scene,34 or conducted experiments to determine issues relevant to the case, 
for example to see how long a car engine takes to cool down,35 or how much cocaine 
could be secreted in a pair of shoes.36 In one drugs case, jurors visited a chemist to 
inquire about the availability and price of ephedrine.37 There have also been some 
instances of jurors looking up information relating to elements of an offence or to the 
court process. For example in R v Harris, printouts containing United States definitions 
of “burden of proof” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” were found in a jury room.38 There 
  
31  Smith, above n 14, at 41. 
32  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
33  Evidence Act 2006, s 76; Juries Act 1981, s 29B; Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand, above n11. 
34  R v Gillespie CA227/88, 7 February 1980. 
35  R v Taka [1992] 2 NZLR 129 (CA). 
36  R v Sangraksa CA503/96, 3 July 1997. 
37  R v Bates, above n 4. 
38  CA121/06, 27 September 2006. 
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are concerns that jurors may believe there is nothing wrong with searching for this type of 
information, because it is not as clearly objectionable as searching for information about 
an accused, for instance. However, there is a risk that jurors may access information that 
is inaccurate, as in Harris, where the definitions were from the United States and did not 
accurately reflect New Zealand law. This demonstrates a need for greater clarity and 
awareness of the law of contempt as it relates to juror research. 
C The Offence of Contempt of Court in New Zealand Law 
 
In this section I outline how the offence of contempt of court functions in New Zealand 
under the status quo. However, I note that the entire contempt jurisdiction is currently 
subject to review by the Law Commission.39 
 
The offence of contempt of court is contained in the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. 
Section 365 relevantly provides for a punishment by imprisonment of up to three months 
or a fine not exceeding $1000 for any person who wilfully and without lawful excuse 
disobeys any order or direction of a court in the course of the hearing of any proceedings.  
The three month imprisonment sentence codifies the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Solicitor-General v Siemer.40 Importantly, however, subs (3) preserves the common law 
of contempt. This means that publication contempt, although not clearly falling within 
any of the three categories in subs (1), is still punishable as contempt of court.  
1 Scope 
 
The law of contempt is potentially applicable once a case is sub judice, or, from the point 
when the commencement of criminal proceedings is “highly likely”.41 Thus the sub 
judice period may begin before a suspect is arrested or charged. It ends once a verdict has 
been reached. In general it does not apply to appeals as the relative chance of prejudice is 
much less after conviction - society has already deemed the person guilty and the appeal 
is not heard by a jury, so there is unlikely to be any additional prejudicial effect arising 
  
39  Law Commission, above n 20. 
40  [2010] NZSC 54, [2010] 3 NZLR 767, at [67]. 
41  Television New Zealand v Solicitor-General, above n 7, at 3. 
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from publications on the issue.42 However, where there is a real risk of prejudice, the 
restrictions imposed by the law of contempt continue whilst the appeal is addressed.43 
 
Because the right to a fair trial is contained in the Bill of Rights Act, which generally 
applies to organs of the state, there are institutional issues about holding the media and 
particularly social media users accountable for breaches of that right.44 However, the 
New Zealand courts have made it quite clear that no right is more inviolate than the right 
to a fair trial, and that it is as close to an absolute right as any.45 This means we have 
endeavoured to find a way to bring “private” acts of the media that may have an impact 
on the right to a fair trial within the scope of the Act. It has been suggested that while the 
initial act of publishing prejudicial material is not affected by the Act, once the trial 
process is underway, the act of the judge in continuing the trial and failing to assess the 
fairness issues will be.46 “The Court will not be impartial if, as a result of the state of 
mind with which the Judge(s) or jury members approach, or can be reasonably 
apprehended as approaching, the determination of the particular dispute or disputes which 
come before them, they are likely to favour one party over another.”47 It follows that as 
soon as the trial court is aware of the facts that are alleged to pose a risk to a fair trial, for 
example the existence of prejudicial publications, then the Bill of Rights Act is engaged 
and the judge must take steps to protect the accused’s rights.48 
2 Actus Reus 
 
The legal test for whether juror misconduct amounts to contempt is whether there is “a 
real risk as opposed to a remote possibility that the actions complained of would 
  
42  The Hon Justice AP Randerson, Chief High Court Judge, “Contempt of Court and the Media” 
LexisNexis Media Law Conference 2008; Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd, above n 1, at 301 
per Lord Reid.  
43  Law Commission, above n 20, at [4.74]. 
44  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3.  
45  Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: a commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2012) at 328; A v Wilson & Horton Ltd (2000) 6 HRNZ 106 (HC); R v Lord Chancellor ex 
parte Witham [1998] QB 575. 
46  Butler and Butler, above n 45, at 808. 
47  At 884. 
48  At 809. 
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undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.”49 For publication 
contempts, the test is similarly whether the actions of the accused “caused a real risk of 
interference with the administration of justice.”50  This is compared to “a remote 
possibility”, demonstrating that there is a threshold requirement as to the degree of risk.51 
There is no requirement as to outcome. This has prompted some concerns, as the test for 
when something is a miscarriage of justice, and thus whether an appeal will be allowed, 
imposes a much higher threshold than contempt of court.52  
3 Mens Rea 
 
Contempt of court is a strict liability offence in that the prosecution does not have to 
establish that the publisher or the jury member intended to interfere with the 
administration of justice by means of the publication or the independent research.53 
However, proof of an intention to interfere with the due administration of justice “may 
assist the conclusion that the publication had the required tendency,” in the case of 
publication contempts.54 Even under the current law, intention may be relevant to the 
penalty.55 For example, if a juror accidentally comes across information, or researches 
basic information such as legal definitions in an aim to ensure they understand the trial, 
they may be seen as less culpable that someone who deliberately seeks information that 
they know is inappropriate, such as previous convictions or other information that would 
be inadmissible as evidence.  
4 Defences 
 
The courts have traditionally held that there is no defence of public interest or fair 
comment, as there are in some other areas of media law, or as there are under the English 
  
49  Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd, above n 15, at 233. 
50  Solicitor-General v Wellington Newspapers [1995] 1 NZLR 45 (HC) at 47. 
51  Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd, above n 15, at 233. 
52  Law Commission, above n 20; Attorney-General v Unger [1998] EMLR 280 at 291.  
53  Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, above n 11, at 55; St James Evening Post (1742) 2 Atk 
469, 24 ER 565. 
54  Solicitor- General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, above n11,  at 55-56 
55  At 56. 
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Contempt of Court Act.56 However, the issue is not totally clear: the courts seem to 
accept that there may be a small number of cases where there are strong policy reasons 
that would permit the publication of information, because the public interest in having the 
issue discussed “outweighs the prejudice which might be occasioned to a party”57 in 
criminal proceedings, particularly where the discussion is general and not explicitly 
linked to the proceedings.58  
 
There may be a limited form of innocent dissemination defence available where a 
publisher receives a newspaper article, for example, from a third party, and takes all due 
care to ensure that the article does not constitute contempt of court.59 This means that 
publishers will often take steps such as contacting the police to ask whether an arrest has 
been made, or asking for evidence that the writer has obtained legal advice to the effect 
that publication will not breach the law of contempt. Even if that legal advice is 
negligent, the publisher has taken all necessary care, thus they cannot be convicted of 
contempt.60  
D The Current Law of Contempt: A Justified Limitation on the Right to Freedom of 
Expression?  
 
Any limitation on a right that is protected in the Bill of Rights Act must be demonstrably 
justified. Section 5 of that Act requires that “the rights and freedoms contained in this Act 
may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” Given that the Bill of Rights Act applies to 
acts of the judiciary, it is important that any judicial decisions as to punishing contemnors 
stands up to s 5 scrutiny. 61  
 
  
56  See generally Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 339; Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, above 
n11, at 56; Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK), s 5.  
57  Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1973] QB 710, [1973] 1 All ER 815, 821. 
58  See Solicitor-General v Smith, above n 12. 
59  Nicol and Robertson, above n 29, at 432-3. 
60  Carey and others, above n 28, at 168 
61  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3(a). 
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The right to freedom of expression is protected by section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s test from R v Oakes62 is adopted in order to apply section 
5:63 
 
1. The legislative objective must be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally guaranteed right. It must relate to societal concerns which are 
“pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society.” 
2.  The means chosen to advance the legislative objective must be reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The three components of this 
assessment are: 
 (a)  there must be a “rational connection” between the measures and the objective they 
are to serve; 
 (b) the measure should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question; 
and 
 (c)  there must be a proportionality between the effects of the limiting measures and 
the objective –  the more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more 
important the objective must be. 
 
Where the right to freedom of expression conflicts with the right to a fair trial, the courts’ 
usual and accepted practice is to curtail the right to freedom of expression temporarily in 
order to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial.64 Where a juror undertakes research into 
matters not in evidence but relevant to the case this undermines the accused’s right to be 
tried solely on the evidence and by an impartial jury, so some limitation on the right to 
freedom of expression is justified in respect of this type of conduct.65 Similarly, where 
prejudicial information is published that may undermine the administration of justice and 
have an adverse effect on an accused’s right to a fair trial by prejudicing the jury pool, it 
seems that some limitation on publication is justified.  
 
Given the high importance of the right to a fair trial, and the temporary nature of limits to 
freedom of expression imposed by the law of contempt, in that publication and research 
  
62  Above n 8, at [138]-[140]. 
63   Hansen v R, above n 9, at [42]. 
64  Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General, above n 19, at 575; Smith, above n 14, at 28; Eric Barendt 
Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) at 324. 
65  Smith, above n 14, at 41. 
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are permitted at any time outside of the sub judice period, it seems that the limit to 
freedom of expression is justified in many cases. This reflects the traditional common law 
priorities, and gives effect to the fact that the Bill of Rights Act allows for limitations on 
rights provided they are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.66 
Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Bill of 
Rights Act is designed to give effect, expresses fair trial rights in absolute terms, where 
the right to freedom of expression is qualified.67 Judges and commentators have similarly 
expressed the view that the right to a fair trial is closer to an absolute right than that of 
freedom of expression.68 
 
 Some Problems with Contempt of Court 
 
In this section I consider some contemporary problems with the operation of the contempt 
jurisdiction. In particular, I outline how the Internet and social media have changed the 
nature of the way in which information is shared, and discuss some problems arising from 
the lack of clarity in the law of contempt. 
A The Impact of Modern Technology on the Right to a Fair Trial 
 
Today, traditional news media outlets are not the only source of information; the Internet 
“allows everyone to be a publisher”.69 Further, “communication can be more or less 
instantaneous, there is no editorial input, and those who use the web may pay no attention 
to the requirements of responsible journalism.”70 For example, while traditional media 
outlets are aware of the importance of name suppression in protecting the identities of 
  
66  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
67  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), arts 14, 19.  
68  Smith, above n 14, at 29; R v B [2008] NZCA 130, [2009] 1 NZLR 293 at [2] per Baragwanath J; R v 
Burns (Travis) [2002] 1 NZLR 387 at 404 per Thomas J; R v Condon [2006] NZSC 62, [2007] 1 NZLR 
300.  
69  Police v Slater [2011] DCR 6 at [11], [15]. 
70  Smith, above n 14, at 23. 
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victims, many others are not. Peaches Geldof’s recent act of “tweeting” the names of 
women who allowed their children to be abused by Ian Watkins illustrates this.71 
 
The Internet also makes a vast amount of information readily available to a large number 
of people.  This is problematic where jurors have been found to have undertaken 
independent research into elements of a case, as it suggests reliance on untested and 
potentially inadmissible evidence in reaching their verdicts.72 Even before the age of 
social media and widespread Internet usage the courts faced a practical problem in 
determining “how far it is sensible to give jurors credit for an ability to set prejudice to 
one side in compliance with their oaths.”73 In Weatherston v R,74 it was argued that the 
publicity attached to the case and the contemporaneous debate over the legitimacy of the 
provocation defence had caused an unfair trial. Although the appeal was unsuccessful, it 
raises important questions about the impact that extrinsic information may have on jurors, 
and how the laws of evidence and trial procedure can be adapted to mitigate that impact. 
The nature of modern media also means that traditional methods for avoiding jury 
prejudice, such as change of venue or postponement of trial, may not be effective.75  
 
The issue of jurors searching for external information is not new - but whereas “decades 
ago they might have sneaked off to look at the crime scene,”76 the Internet 
“unquestionably” exacerbates the potential for jurors to undertake their own research.77 
Butler and Butler note that the “nature of potential harms posed by a new technology or 
social phenomenon are unknown, and are the subject of speculation.” 78 The increase in 
the use of the Internet and Internet-capable devices, such as smartphones, has increased 
the “magnitude of the risk” that a juror will access information inappropriately.79 
  
71  Greenhill, above n 3. 
72  Smith, above n 14, at 41; R v Karakaya [2005] 2 Cr App R 5. 
73   R v Hubbert (1975) 29 CCC (2d) 279 at 291. 
74  [2011] NZCA 276, [2013] NZLJ 121. 
75  See Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General, above n 19, at 575. 
76  (11 March 2014) Public Bill Committee Deb GBOD HC 67, per Professor David Ormerod, Law 
Commissioner for Criminal Law. 
77  Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.5]. 
78  Butler and Butler, above n 57, at 134. 
79  (11 March 2014) Public Bill Committee Deb GBOD HC 67, per Professor David Ormerod, Law 
Commissioner for Criminal Law. 
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B Lack of Clarity in the Law of Contempt 
 
It is often said that the law of contempt is problematic because it is not clear whether 
particular conduct constitutes “contempt”, and whether a prosecution will take place.80 
The common law standard in New Zealand is that the conduct must create a “real risk” of 
interference with the administration of justice; there is no requirement as to the actual 
effect of the conduct. The Law Commission has suggested two justifications for this. 
First, “there is no way of establishing empirically whether a jury’s deliberations were in 
fact improperly influenced by exposure to prejudicial” information.81 Secondly, “this 
form of contempt is considered to be a prophylactic jurisdiction”, concerned with the 
tendency to cause harm.82 However, it also notes that the threshold is relatively low, so a 
large amount of conduct is caught by the law of contempt. 83 In some cases, a particular 
publication may constitute a contempt, but it may be impossible to demonstrate that the 
publication actually had any effect on the outcome of the case. This would mean that a 
person convicted in the case to which the publicity relates is unable to appeal successfully 
on the ground of miscarriage of justice.84 This creates an anomaly and is likely to be 
viewed as unfair by defendants and the general public.  
 
Further, it seems generally accepted in New Zealand that the offence of contempt of court 
is strict liability.85 However, there are some cases in the United Kingdom which suggest 
that an intention may be required: in Attorney-General v Davey and Attorney-General v 
Beard, the Court considered that an intention to prejudice the administration of justice in 
some way was a constituent element of the offence of contempt of court.86 In Attorney-
General v Davey, a juror was found to be in contempt after posting a Facebook update 
soon after being empaneled, saying “Wooow I wasn’t expecting to be in a jury deciding a 
paedophile’s fate, I’ve always wanted to f*** up a paedophile and now I’m within the 
  
80  Smith, above n 14, at 24.  
81  Law Commission, above n 20, at [4.12]. 
82  At [4.12]. 
83  At [4.12]. 
84  At [4.10]; see also Attorney-General v Unger, above n 44, at 291 per Simon Brown LJ.  
85  Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, above n 11, 48 at 56.  
86  [2013] EWHC 2317 (Admin). 
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law!” In Attorney-General v Beard, a juror was held to be in contempt following an 
allegation that he had undertaken research on the Internet, by typing the defendants’ 
names into a search engine.  There are also cases from the same jurisdiction that seem to 
make it clear that intention is irrelevant. For example, in Attorney-General v Fraill and 
Sewart, a juror contacted a defendant after he had been acquitted to tell him how pleased 
she was with the verdict. The juror was sentenced to immediate custody for eight months 
even though it was accepted that she was not involved in any attempt to pervert the 
course of justice.87 While Fraill more accurately reflects statements of the law in New 
Zealand than Davey or Beard do, the fact that our contempt laws are not codified leaves it 
open for the courts to adopt a different position. As noted above, there are also some 
unresolved questions as to whether a public interest defence is available and in what 
circumstances.  
 
Some judges have also identified problems with the terminology of “contempt”. Jurors 
may not understand that conducting their own research into information relevant to a case 
constitutes a contempt, as the word “contempt” may convey the impression that the 
offence exists to protect a particular court or judge from insult, rather than aiding in the 
important objective of preserving the fair administration of justice.88  
 
A further area of difficulty is when exactly a person may be liable for contempt, or, in 
other words, when the sub judice period begins and ends. It is recognised that the 
beginning and length of the sub judice period in any given case is variable.89 It begins at 
the commencement of criminal proceedings – either with the making of an arrest or the 
laying of an information. The Law Commission notes that “[t]he precise timing of these 
events, once they have occurred, may be ascertainable, but is neither predictable in 
advance nor generally publicly known.”90 This makes it difficult for the media to 
ascertain when they are allowed to publish certain material, and is therefore likely to have 
a chilling effect on publication.  
  
87  Above n 6. 
88  See Attorney-General v Times Newspapers, above n 1, at 322; Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 QB 114; 
Frances Quinn Law for Journalists (Pearson Longman, England, 2007) at 63. 
89  Nicol and Robertson, above n 29, at 426. 
90  Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials – Discussion Paper (NZLC PP37, 1999) at 74. 
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This section has demonstrated that there is a need for greater clarity in the law of 
contempt of court. The rest of this paper considers how that could best be achieved. 
 
 Options for Reform 
 
In this section, I consider whether there are alternatives to publication bans that may 
strike a better balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right to a fair 
trial. A number of alternatives to using the contempt jurisdiction to ban publications were 
considered in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Dagenais.91 In that case, Lamer 
CJ noted that a hierarchical approach to rights should be avoided if possible, and that 
publication should only be banned where absolutely necessary and where the meritorious 
effects of a ban would outweigh the harms caused by limiting expression. His Honour 
suggested that judges should consider all other options, and determine that no other 
reasonable and effective alternative is available, before imposing a publication ban. 92 
 
Our Court of Appeal has rejected many of these options,93 but if we were to codify the 
law of contempt there would be scope to reconsider this decision. For example, although 
juror sequestration is no longer routine, the Juries Act 1981 makes provision for 
sequestration if necessary in the interests of justice.94 The Act also provides for 
challenging potential jury members where their impartiality is in doubt.95 Both of these 
mechanisms could potentially be adapted or more widely-used to ensure that jurors were 
not influenced by prejudicial publicity. In this section I consider these as well as a 
number of other options. In particular, I discuss: delays or changes of venue; routine and 
longer-term sequestration; greater use of challenges and juror vetting; improving the 
quality and consistency of jury directions; amending the juror oath; increasing the ability 
of jurors to participate and to use information technology during a trial; and judge-alone 
  
91  Dagenais v Canadianb Broadcasting Corporation (1995) 94 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC).  
92  At  317. 
93  See Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General, above n 19, at 575. 
94 s 29A(2). 
95  ss 24, 25.  
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trials.96 I also consider whether a specific statutory offence of jurors undertaking 
independent research may be appropriate. 
A Delay or Change of Venue 
 
It has been suggested that delaying a trial until the effect of any prejudicial publicity has 
faded from the minds of the jury pool may be a better solution than limiting the right to 
freedom of expression. There have also been suggestions that moving the location of the 
trial to some place where the effect of prejudicial publicity may not have been felt may 
prevent any risk to a fair trial. 97 However, there are issues with delaying a trial, as this 
may conflict with an accused’s right to trial without undue delay.98 It may also be 
problematic for witnesses and victims, whose lives may be effectively “on hold” while 
they wait for the trial. 
 
Our Court of Appeal has suggested that venue changes are inconvenient to witnesses and 
others involved, and incur significant expenses. It also noted that there is some value to 
the community in trying an offence in the area in which the alleged crime occurred.99 
Importantly in the modern era, it is also difficult to see how a change of venue could be 
effective in limiting the impact of prejudicial publicity.100 While there may be less 
interest amongst the community to which the trial is moved in reading about people they 
do not know or who do not live near them, it is highly likely that members of that 
community will have been exposed to similar publicity about the alleged crime through 
newspapers and online media. This is even more so where the alleged crime is 
particularly shocking to people’s sensibilities.  
 
  
96  Smith, above n 14, at 34, 36, 42; R v Johnson CA 60/04, 29 March 2004; Dagenais v Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, above n 91. 
97  Dagenais v Canadianb Broadcasting Corporation, above n 91, at 337.  
98  Gisborne Herald v Solicitor General, above n 19, at 576.  
99  At 576. 
100 Thomas Beisecker “The Role of Change of Venue in an Electronic Age” (1994) 4 Kan. J. L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 81 at 84. 
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B Routine, Longer-Term Sequestration 
 
The Court of Appeal in Gisborne Herald rejected this option, as it considered that 
sequestration would add to the existing, sometimes significant, pressures on jurors.101 The 
Law Commission has also commented that it would run counter to modern developments 
to return to routine sequestration for the duration of the trial.102 For example, we have 
moved away from confining jurors without food or drink until they reach their verdicts, to 
allowing them to have refreshments, and generally to return to their homes overnight 
during their deliberations.103 Routine sequestration may be seen as an unjustified limit on 
jurors’ freedoms of movement. In the light of the fact that jury service is seen as an 
unwanted imposition into many people’s lives already, we should be wary of adopting 
measures that make it even more onerous.  
 
It is also important to note that sequestration may not result in less bias or better 
deliberations. For example, it will not prevent potential jurors from being exposed to 
prejudicial publicity before they are empanelled.104 Further, sequestered jurors may feel 
pressure to come to a verdict quickly, which may impair their ability to deliberate without 
passion.105 
C A More Interactive Approach to Empanelling the Jury: Challenges and Juror 
Vetting 
 
The next two options discussed focus more directly on the harm in question, that of juror 
bias as a result of prejudicial publicity. The first of these is greater use of challenges for 
cause, or vetting the pool of potential jurors. 
 
  
101 Gisborne Herald v Solicitor General, above n 19, at 576. 
102 Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.45]. 
103 James Ogloff and others The Jury Project: Stage One – A Survey of Australian and New Zealand Judges 
(The Australian Institute of judicial Administration Incorporated, Melbourne, 2006) at 3. 
104 Joseph R Mariniello “The Death Penalty and Pre-Trial Publicity: Are Today’s Attempts at Guaranteeing 
a Fair Trial Aequate?” (1994) 8 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol’y 371 at 375.  
105 Michael Chesterman “OJ and the Dingo: How Media Publicity Relating to Criminal Cases Tried by Jury 
is Dealt With in Australia and America” (1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 109 at 135.  
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As noted above, the Juries Act does provide for challenging potential jury members 
where their impartiality is in doubt.106 It has been suggested in some cases that increased 
use of challenge for cause may be the most effective way of ensuring that the jury pool is 
not tainted by prejudicial publicity.107 New Zealand judges have expressed distaste for the 
voir dire jury selection process often adopted in the United States, however.108 For 
example, in Gisborne Herald, the Court of Appeal considered that it would be 
undesirable and unnecessarily time-consuming to cross-examine potential jurors in order 
to determine whether their minds had been affected by prejudicial publicity.109 It also 
noted that in the United States, where jury selection takes place in a lengthy voir dire 
session, or a “system of interrogation where potential jurors are asked questions to 
determine bias prior to challenge,” it may take up to six weeks to select a jury.110 The 
delay caused may run counter to the right to trial without delay, or at the very least cause 
administrative difficulties and incur extra costs. 
 
In R v Sanders, the High Court considered that voir dire determination of potential juror 
bias is a waste of time, and an imperfect instrument to secure a fair trial.111 The Court 
suggested that prospective jurors could be questioned only if the circumstances were 
“wholly exceptional”,112 and was clear the judgment did not constitute “a licence to 
examine and cross-examine prospective jurors as to what they believe or do not 
believe.”113 The Court also noted that it would be “naive” to expect that it would be 
possible to select 12 jurors who had not heard anything about a notorious case.114 It did 
not consider this to be particularly problematic, however. There are a number of judges 
who have expressed the view that jurors will heed the warning to avoid prejudice, and 
  
106  ss 24, 25.  
107 R v Kray (1969) 53 Cr App R 412. 
108  Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General, above n 19, at 575; R v Sanders [1995] 3 NZLR 545 (CA); 
compare Sheppard v Maxwell 384 US 33 (1986). 
109 At 19; see also R v Sanders, above n 108. 
110 Stephen Dunstan and others “Trial By Peers? The Composition of New Zealand Juries” (1995, 
Department of Justice, Wellington) at 31. 
111 Above n 108; See also R v Greening [1957] NZLR 906, 915 (CA); William Kastin “Presumed Guilty: 
Trial by the Media – The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Protect Criminal Defendants in High Publicity 
Cases” (1992) 10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 107 at 114. 
112 R v Sanders, above n 108, at 517. 
113 At 520, citing R v Kray, above n 107. 
114 At 520, citing R v Hubbert, above n 73. 
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that “it is a matter of common experience that in the dignified and dispassionate 
atmosphere of the Courtroom, any feelings of revulsion against the crimes themselves, 
sympathy to the victim, or prejudice against the accused, soon disappear.”115 It has also 
been suggested that, “unless we act on the assumption that criminal juries act on the 
evidence and in accordance with the directions of the trial judge, there is no point in 
having criminal jury trials.”116 Richardson J has also commented favourably on jurors’ 
abilities to ignore prejudicial material, in R v Halkyard and Harawira.117 Moreover, 
studies have shown that potential jurors are more likely to remember general themes of 
publicity than specific details.118 However, this must be balanced against research which 
has demonstrated that publicity which indicates a defendant’s culpability is more likely to 
cause prejudice than bare details of the offence,119 and that emotive reporting is more 
prejudicial than factual reporting.120 
 
There are also some suggestions that questioning potential jurors to screen for bias will 
not necessarily result in a jury free of prejudice, as jurors may not admit to their 
prejudices, in order to appear helpful to the court or to secure a spot on the jury.121 This 
suggestion is in contrast with the widely-held view that people generally do not want to 
do jury service – in a 1993 survey, only 26 per cent of summonsed potential jurors 
actually reported for jury service.122 Therefore the extent to which potential jurors may be 
motivated to lie about their prejudices is questionable. However, there is also an 
argument that potential jurors may not even be aware of their own bias, and therefore will 
not report it.123 
 
  
115 R v Hamley HC Timaru 24 April 1980; R v Hamley CA17/81. 
116 Gilbert v The Queen [2000] HCA 15; (2000) 201 CLR 414 at [31]; see also Montgomery v HM Advocate 
[2003] 1 AC 641 at 674.  
117 [1989] 2 NZLR 714, 729 (CA). 
118 Nancy Steblay and others “The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts” (1999) 23 Law and 
Human Behaviour 219 at 227.  
119 Norbert Kerr “The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors” (1994) 78 Judicature 120 at 122. 
120 TM Honess and others “Empirical and Legal Perspectives on the Impact of Pre-Trial Publicity” [2002] 
Crim LR 719. 
121 Minow and Cate “Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?” (1990-1) 40 ANU Law Review 
631 at 650.  
122 Dunstan and others, above n 110, at 43. 
123 Minow and Cate, above n 121, at 651.  
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It seems that on the whole, questioning potential jurors in order to determine prejudice, 
prior to a challenge for cause, is not sufficiently effective to make it worth the extra time 
and distress it may cause to jurors. It is suggested that a voir dire where prospective 
jurors are questioned as to potential biases will be stressful: first because having to go 
through a process akin to cross-examination is inherently stressful; and secondly because 
it may result in a challenge for cause. A challenge for cause, unlike a peremptory 
challenge, has the potential to embarrass the juror as it requires a declaration of the 
reason for challenge.124 
 
However, there is something to be said for a modified form of jury vetting. In R v 
Johnson, the Court of Appeal explained that:125 
 
... it may be appropriate for the panel to be addressed by the Judge before they are brought 
into Court. They should be provided with a list of the victims and the witnesses and asked to 
consider whether there are any reasons which would affect their ability to consider the matter 
objectively and impartially ... Those members of the panel who do raise relevant matters of 
concern would then be excused by the Judge before the empanelling itself commences. 
 
This approach was adopted in R v Skelton, in which the Judge said that in the course of 
the empanelling process, potential jurors who have personal relationships with the 
victims or parties, or who have strong views which would make it difficult for them to sit 
on a jury with an open mind should be excused from jury duty. 126 This approach is now 
standard practice in New Zealand courts. 
D Better Jury Directions 
 
In Z v DPP, Finlay CJ considered that: 127 
even where there is a real risk of unfairness, that risk does not entail the drastic remedy of 
a prohibition of the trial unless the likelihood of unfairness is unavoidable by other 
  
124 Dunstan and others, above n 110, at 101. 
125 R v Johnson CA 60/04, 29 March 2004. 
126 R v Skelton CRI-2007-019-6530 (HC) at [118]. 
127 [1994] 2 IR 476 (IrSC). 
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means. So where, for example, the likelihood of unfairness can be averted by directions to 
the jury then that is the appropriate way of dealing with the matter. 
 
This section considers the important question of whether jury directions are sufficient to 
avoid any undue prejudice. Unfortunately, this is a question that probably cannot be given 
a definitive answer, as there are limitations on the research that can be done: it is 
prohibited, except in certain circumstances, to speak to jurors about their deliberations, 
but it is also difficult to obtain accurate data as to jurors’ prejudices and understanding of 
judicial directions when researchers have to rely on self-reporting.128 
 
A 2006 research project found that judicial directions as to the need to avoid reliance on 
material not in evidence varied greatly.129 For example, 18 per cent of New Zealand 
judges told jurors, “Do not access the Internet to obtain information about the case”, in 
their opening remarks, whereas 57 per cent said not to conduct their own investigations 
by doing things like visiting the crime scene.130 About half the judges surveyed said that 
they regularly explained to the jury why having conversations with non-jurors would be 
improper, as would considering material external to the trial.131  
 
The researchers considered that “one explanation for these relatively low figures is that 
judges may be concerned that by telling jurors not to access certain material, at least one 
of them may be encouraged to do so.”132 This raises an important issue pertaining to jury 
directions – “the power of suggestion.”133 There is a fairly commonly-held view that 
“telling the jury not to look at extraneous material is much the same as telling children to 
walk past a sweet shop without looking inside.”134 If they are not told why they cannot 
  
128 Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials – Part Two: A summary of the research findings (NZLC 
PP37, 1999) at 5.  
129 Ogloff and others, above n 103. 
130 At 12. 
131 At 12. 
132 At 12. 
133 At 12. 
134  Law Commission of England and Wales Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet 
Publications - Responses to Consultation (LC340, 2013) at [2.157]. 
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look on the Internet for information, for example, they may be given the impression that 
there is some particularly scandalous information there for them to find.135  
 
New Zealand currently has no uniform jury direction in relation to this issue: judges are 
free to develop their own direction to some extent. For example, one District Court Judge 
says the following in his first address to the jury:136 
 
There is another very important thing I must tell you.  You must not discuss this case with 
any other person during any adjournment.  You must not make any inquiries or investigations 
of your own.  You must not talk about it in public or around the court precincts.  Keep your 
discussions in the jury room.  The reason for this is that it is crucially important that you 
decide whether this defendant is guilty or not guilty solely on the basis of the evidence called 
in this Court.  It would be unfair if something they didn't know about was to be used for or 
against either the Crown or the accused. 
 
If you were to talk about the case with some other person, that person may know about the 
case, or even if they don't, may have an opinion on how you should decide the case.  That 
must not happen.  You may discuss the case amongst yourselves in the jury room during any 
adjournment as much as you wish.  But until you have delivered your verdict, you must tell 
anyone who asks that the judge said that you are not to talk about the case until you have 
delivered the verdict. Please tell a member of the court staff if anyone attempts to speak to 
you about the case. 
 
The best rule is to keep it in the jury room.  We do not want to have to stop the trial and start 
again with another jury.  
 
However, other New Zealand judges may give more or less detailed directions. It is 
desirable that all juries are given the same direction. One option for reform would be to 
include a more detailed direction in the Bench Book for Judges, to ensure greater 
consistency and informational value of directions.  Other jurisdictions may provide 
  
135  At [3.212]; Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials – Discussion Paper (NZLC PP37, 1999) at 56. 
136 Email from Judge William Hastings to Emma Smith regarding Jury Directions (4 September 214). 
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examples or model directions that could be adopted. For example, in Queensland, the 
Bench Book directs judges to inform the jury that they must:137 
 
Pay careful attention to the evidence, and ignore anything you may hear or read about the 
case out of court. You may discuss the case amongst yourselves. But you must not discuss it 
with anyone else. The reason is this: you are the 12 people who are to determine the outcome 
of this trial; and solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom. Do not take the risk 
of any external influence on your minds. So do not speak to anyone who is not a member of 
this jury about the case. If anyone else attempts to talk to you about this trial, try to 
discourage them, do not tell anyone else who is on this jury, but mention the matter to the 
bailiff when you get back to court so that it can be brought to my attention. In the same way 
if, while you are outside this courtroom, you inadvertently overhear something about this 
trial, do not tell anyone else on the jury but tell the bailiff so that can also be brought to my 
attention. And do not attempt to investigate it or to inquire about the defendant yourselves. 
 
It is inherently unjust for you to act on information which is not in evidence and the 
prosecution and defence do not know you are acting on. This is because they have not had an 
opportunity to test the accuracy of the information and whether it is applicable to the 
particular person. Information in the public area is not always accurate. It may be referring to 
someone else, e.g. with a similar name. The prosecution and the defence have not had the 
opportunity to test the material as they do with the evidence. 
 
There have been instances where a jury has made private investigations and mistrials have 
resulted or new trials have been ordered on successful appeals. That illustrates the unfairness. 
Also private inquiries may lead to inaccuracies, for example, a scene may well have changed 
dramatically over time. Private investigations would not reveal what changes have occurred. 
 
A jury direction along similar lines would be very likely to prove helpful in educating the 
jury as to the importance of their role, and the fundamental principle that they must not 
go outside the evidence. 
 
It has also been suggested that in order for the law of contempt to have the desired effect, 
it must be explained to jurors what they are being asked to do and why.138 David 
  
137 Queensland Law Reform Commission A Review of Jury Directions (Report No 66, Vol 1, December 
2009) at 248-9. 
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Sklansky has argued that jury instructions work better “when the judge gives the jury a 
reason to follow them.”139 Thus improving jurors’ understanding of the purpose of the 
law will be essential in ensuring compliance. The US Federal Judicial Centre has issued 
the following guideline direction:140 
 
You must not communicate with or provide any information to anyone by any means about 
this case. You may not use any electronic device or media, such as the telephone, a cell 
phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer, the Internet, any Internet service, any 
text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, 
MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about 
this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. In other words, 
you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone, or electronically 
communicate with anyone about this case. You can only discuss the case in the jury room 
with your fellow jurors during deliberations. I expect you will inform me as soon as you 
become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions. You may not use these 
electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because it is important that 
you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this courtroom.  
 
Information on the Internet or available through social media might be wrong, incomplete, or 
inaccurate. You are only permitted to discuss the case with your fellow jurors during 
deliberations because they have seen and heard the same evidence you have. In our judicial 
system, it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of this 
courtroom. Otherwise, your decision may be based on information known only by you and 
not your fellow jurors or the parties in the case. This would unfairly and adversely impact the 
judicial process. 
 
The Bench Book for New South Wales also refers to the use of other aids, such as legal 
textbooks, and instructs jurors that they may not have someone else make inquiries or 
conduct research on their behalf.141  Many judges also direct jurors to report any of their 
colleagues who they see conducting their own research. 
                                                                                                                                            
138  Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [3.296]. 
139 David Sklansky “Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other” (2012) 65 Stan L Rev at 8. 
140 Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management Model Jury Instructions 
on The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on or Communicate about a Case (2012), 
cited in Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [3.194].  
141 Judicial Commission of New South Wales Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book (Judicial Commission of 
New South Wales, Sydney, 2000) at 112. 
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Jury directions may also be utilised in an attempt to minimise the effect of prejudicial 
publicity.142 Where a witness gives evidence that is inadmissible, one remedy for this is a 
direction to the jury to ignore that particular statement.143 Similarly, where evidence is of 
dubious accuracy, for example hearsay evidence, a jury direction is often considered 
appropriate to remind jurors to be careful about giving it too much weight.144 It may be 
that where judges become aware of prejudicial information that has caught the jury’s 
attention, or is likely to, that they can simply issue a direction to the jury to put that 
information out of their minds.145 This is the approach taken in the United States, where 
the First Amendment to the Constitution provides for much greater press freedom.146 
 
The obvious question that arises in this context is whether jury directions are effective. 
As Mathieson points out, “no discussion of the law of evidence in criminal cases will 
ever be completely satisfactory until we have some idea of the extent to which the 
average jury understands the directions which the law requires the Judge to give.”147 The 
Law Commission has noted that:148 
 
In some aspects jurors are treated as if they were low grade morons ... They are assumed to 
have insufficient intellectual capacity to evaluate ordinary hearsay evidence even with the 
help of counsel who can point out the dangers of uncross-examined material ... On the other 
hand, they are deemed to have extraordinary intellectual capacity and superlative emotional 
control. They can refrain from drawing any inference against an accused because of his 
failure to testify on his own behalf or against a party who claims privilege preventing 
disclosure of material facts ... Of course, the truth is that the jurors are neither so foolish as 
some of the rules they are supported to follow, nor so wise or able as other rules assume them 
to be. 
  
142 Nicol and Robertson, above n 29, at 406.  
143 Evidence Act 2006, s 122. 
144 s 122(2)(a). 
145 Solicitor-General v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-705, 10 October 2008 at 
[126].  
146 Eric Barendt, above n 64, at 334; See also Nebraska Press Assn v Judge Hugh Stuart 427 US 539; Near 
v Minnesota 283 US 697. 
147 DL Mathieson Cross on Evidence (8th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at [3.2]. 
148 Law Commission Evidence Law: Principles for Reform (NZLC PP13, 1991) at [26], citing Edmund 
Morgan in Model Code of Evidence (American Law Institute, 1946) at 8-10. 
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Traditionally, the courts have said that they generally trust juries to put prejudicial 
information out of their minds in response to judicial directions.149 However, some 
studies have cast doubt on the validity of this claim, suggesting that jurors “will defy 
instructions and do their own research if they feel it will assist them in coming to the right 
verdict.”150 Therefore it seems that better jury directions about not undertaking their own 
research, and the reasons for such a restriction, may go some way towards improving 
compliance, but they are not an answer in themselves.  
E Juror Oath and Express Acknowledgment 
 
Another option is to require jurors to provide some form of express acknowledgement of 
their oath, to show that they understand their duty to decide only on the evidence before 
them. The Law Commission for England and Wales has recently recommended an 
amendment to the juror oath in those jurisdictions, to include a promise to base the 
verdict on the evidence presented in court and not to seek or disclose information relating 
to the case.151 It has also recommended that jurors be asked to sign a written declaration 
on their first day of service, acknowledging that they have been warned not to undertake 
their own research.152 This would have the dual effect of educating jurors about the 
contents and importance of their oath, and providing a clear basis for the imposition of 
sanctions if necessary.  
F Greater Jury Participation in the Trial Process 
 
Another suggestion from the Law Commission would involve alterations to the way 
evidence is presented and the way that a jury participates in a trial, in an attempt to 
  
149  See, for example, R v Kray, above n 107; Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 137, at [4.34]; 
Yuill v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 530 at 453-4; R v Horsham Justices, ex parte Farquharson [1982] 1 QB 
762 at 162.  
150  Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.37]; Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials – Part Two: A 
summary of the research findings (NZLC PP37, 1999) at [7.44]-[4.45]; see also Cheryl Thomas Are 
Juries Fair? (Ministry of Justice (UK), Research Series 1/10, February 2010). 
151 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [5.35]. (Emphasis added). 
152 At [5.40]-[5.41]. 
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obviate any perceived need on the part of jurors to undertake their own research.153 
Specifically, it has suggested that “making it easier for jurors to ask questions and have 
the judge explain legal and technical matters” may aid in this endeavour,154 and that 
“[g]reater deployment of information technology in the courtroom may also be of some 
assistance as it could meet some of the interactive need and address juror 
expectations.”155 The Queensland Law Reform Commission has also suggested that 
frustration at feeling that they are not meaningfully involved in a trial “might well lead 
jurors to undertake their own enquiries, contrary to the law and contrary to their oath, if 
they feel that their task is being thwarted,”156 and that:157 
 
a frustrated jury is more likely to seek outside information about the case or the defendant 
than one that is satisfied that it has, or will in due course be given, all the information that it 
needs. Given the ease with which jurors can make their own enquiries of the circumstances of 
cases that they are trying, every reasonable effort should be made to seek to ensure that they 
are not motivated to do so by a feeling of frustration with the trial itself. 
 
The first suggestion, of facilitating juror questions better, is sound. However, it is 
important to note that jurors are currently able to ask questions of the judge, as the New 
Zealand Bench Book provides that judges must give the jury advice, before the trial 
starts, “that if the evidence is confusing, unclear or not heard, or if the jury has any other 
concerns, then the Judge should be alerted as soon as possible. This may be done by a 
question to the Judge through the foreperson."158 There is also provision for the jury to 
put questions to witnesses if they wish, although these are vetted by the judge first.159 In 
spite of this, a 2006 study found that only 39 per cent of New Zealand judges discuss 
with jurors whether they may ask questions, that many judges “do not encourage jurors to 
ask questions, while some actually discourage them from doing so.”160 It would seem 
  
153 Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.43]-[5.44]. 
154 At [5.43]. 
155 At [5.44]. 
156 Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 137, at [10.168], citing Chris Richardson “Juries: What 
they think of us” (December 2003, Qld Bar News, 16). 
157 Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 137, at [10.187]. 
158 Email from Judge William Hastings, above n 136. 
159 Evidence Act 2006, s 101. 
160 Ogloff and others, above n 103, at 16. 
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then that there is merit in the suggestion that judges should be more encouraging of 
questions from the jury, and this may in fact “reduce any temptation for jurors to make 
their own enquiries about the case they are hearing, by reducing jurors’ concerns or 
frustration about particular aspects of the evidence that seem to them to be inadequately 
covered.”161 
 
In respect of the second suggestion, it has been said that “if courts want to curb access to 
information outside the courtroom, a better information flow and more engagement 
within the courtroom is needed.”162 An Australian Judge has also commented that:163 
 
There is something faintly ridiculous about criticising lay people who go to a standard 
reference source for assistance on a question of fact such as the meaning of an ordinary 
English word when that is exactly what any reasonable person would expect them to do. 
 
This demonstrates the need for counsel and judges to be clear and comprehensive in their 
presentation of evidence and information to a jury. Process matters, such as the order that 
particular witnesses are called, or whether the defence opens immediately after the 
prosecution, can have a significant impact on jurors’ comprehension of the issues in the 
trial.164 Other initiatives may also need to be considered, such as providing for the use of 
a computer in the jury room, or presenting information using a range of media. Both of 
these may assist the jury’s understanding of important terms within the trial, and reduce 
their need to go beyond the information presented in court. 
G Statutory Criminalisation of Independent Research by Jurors 
 
The Criminal Justice and Courts Bill (UK) would amend the Juries Act 1974 (UK) to 
make it a statutory offence, punishable by a fine or two years’ imprisonment, or both, for 
jurors to conduct their own research into matters relating to trial.165 New South Wales, 
  
161 Queensland Law Reform Commission above n 137, at [10.167]. 
162 Jacqueline Horan “Juries in the 21st Century” (Federation Press, Melbourne, 2012) at 198-200. 
163 R v Benbrika (Ruling Nos 35.01-35.11) [2009] VSC 142 at [114] per Bongiorno J. 
164 Ogloff and others, above n 103, at 4.  
165 Criminal Justice and Courts Bill (UK) 2013-2014 (192), cl 42. See Appendix.  
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Queensland, and Victoria already have similar laws.166 It would also make it an offence 
to disclose information about the jury’s deliberations,167 and provide for jurors to be 
required to surrender electronic communications devices, with court officers having 
search powers to enforce the requirement.168 In this section I consider whether New 
Zealand ought to adopt a similar provision.  
 
A major advantage of introducing a statutory offence along the lines of the UK Bill 
would be to provide for greater clarity for jurors. It is already a contempt of court for 
jurors to undertake independent research. However, it is not clear whether it is a common 
law contempt by its own nature, or a contempt pursuant to section 365(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act.169 The content of judges’ directions is not uniform,170 meaning 
that it may not always be clear whether section 365 is available to prosecute a juror who 
is found to have conducted their own research. Further, judicial directions may not be 
sufficiently explicit. For example, instructing a jury to come to its verdict “on the 
evidence” would seem to imply that the jury must not consider anything outside the 
evidence, but it could be clearer. What constitutes “research” or “going beyond the 
evidence” may not always be clear either – in some cases jurors have thought it was 
permissible to look up legal definitions, for example.171  
 
The UK Bill is very clear - potential or current jurors should be easily able to ascertain 
what types of conduct are or are not prohibited. Subsection (2) provides that a person 
“researches” a case only if they intentionally seek information, and that, when they do so, 
they know or ought reasonably to know that the information may be relevant to the case. 
For example, subsection (4) lists different types of information that may constitute 
“information relevant to the case” and includes matters such as the law relating to the 
case, the law of evidence, and any person involved in any way in the trial. A provision 
along the lines of the UK Bill would be an improvement on the current law. Jurors will be 
  
166  Jury Act 1977 (NSW), s 68C; Jury Act 1995 (Qld), s 69A; Juries Act 2000 (Vic), s 78A. 
167  Juries Act 1974 (UK), s 45, as amended by Criminal Justice and Courts Bill (UK) 2013-2014. 
168  s 40, 41. 
169  Law Commission, above n 20, [5.13]-[5.16]. 
170  At [5.17]. 
171  Law Commission, Juries in Criminal Trials – Part Two: A summary of the research findings, above n 
123. 
38  
 
in a better position to appreciate their limitations if this forbidden form of conduct is 
defined by Parliament.172  
  
It would seem obvious that there is a rational connection between the limiting provision 
and its objective, and it has been noted by New Zealand judges that it would be rare for a 
court to conclude that the objective of the legislature in criminalising certain behaviour 
was a policy goal without legitimacy.173 If jurors are deterred from undertaking 
independent research because of this legislation, then they are less likely to come into 
contact with information that may prejudice the fairness of the trial or may adversely 
affect public perceptions of the court system. For such a provision to be effective, it must 
be explained to jurors what they are being asked to do and why.174 If they are not told 
why they cannot look on the Internet for information, for example, they may be given the 
impression that there is some particularly scandalous information there for them to 
find.175 Improving jurors’ understanding of the purpose of the law will be essential in 
ensuring compliance. 
 
The largest area of concern with respect to statutory criminalisation is likely to be that of 
proportionality. It has been suggested jury service is already a significant imposition into 
people’s lives, and that exposing jurors to potential statutory criminal sanctions is 
unwarranted and will result in more people seeking to be excused from performing this 
civic duty.176 However, the wording of the provision should alleviate this concern 
somewhat. For example, it ensures that a juror who accidentally receives information, for 
example if it is posted by a friend on a social media website, has not committed an 
offence.177 It is also possible that a sentencing judge would take into account the degree 
of effort to which a juror went in order to access the information. Whether or not the 
  
172 (11 March 2014) Public Bill Committee Debate GBPD HC 71, per Professor David Ormerod, Law 
Commissioner for Criminal Law. 
173  Hansen v R, above n 9, at [207] per McGrath J.  
174  Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [3.296]. 
175  At [3.212]; Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials – Discussion Paper, above n 90, at 56. 
176  Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.49]. 
177  Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [3.95]. 
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offending juror shared the information with other jurors, or tried to influence them using 
the information they obtained, may also be a relevant factor.178 
H Judge-Alone Trials 
 
One option that the Law Commission also considered was “some broadening of the 
grounds [for a judge-alone trial] to also cover the risk of significant prejudicial pretrial 
publicity preventing a fair trial before a jury.”179 There are already some jurisdictions that 
allow a judge-alone trial where there are concerns that there is no way to get around the 
problem of pretrial publicity. Queensland is one such example, where the Criminal Code 
Act 1899 specifically lists the danger of pretrial publicity that may affect jury 
deliberations as a risk factor that a judge can consider when deciding whether a judge-
alone trial is appropriate.180  
 
Our Law Commission has suggested that a judge-alone trial would be appropriate only 
where that is “the only effective way to overcome the problem” of prejudicial pretrial 
publicity.181 This suggestion is in line with the fact that there are very limited grounds on 
which a trial judge may determine that there should be a judge-alone trial: the Criminal 
Procedure Act 2011 only permits a judge-alone trial where the case is long and complex 
or where jurors have been intimidated.182 The importance of a jury trial is also recognised 
in the fact that category four, or the most serious offences, must be tried by a jury.183 I 
consider the Law Commission’s suggested approach to be appropriate, therefore. It is 
important that the media do not dictate the mode of trial.184 
 
  Recommendations 
 
  
178  See for example, Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.50]; Attorney-General v Fraill and Sewart, above 
n 6, at [55]. 
179 Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.54]. 
180 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 615(4)(c). 
181 Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.54] 
182 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 102-103. 
183 See also Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264, [1985] HCA 72 at [52].  
184 Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials (R 69, 2001) at 48.  
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In this final section, I make recommendations as to the best options for reforming the law 
of contempt of court. Primarily, I argue that the focus should be on preventing jurors 
from undertaking their own research, rather than on prohibiting publication. I suggest that 
the offence of jurors undertaking their own investigation be codified, along similar lines 
to the UK Bill. I recommend that statutory criminalisation be accompanied by a suite of 
measures to improve juror understanding of the importance of not looking outside the 
evidence, and to decrease any problems that currently exist in the trial process that may 
prompt jurors to undertake their own research. 
 
New Zealand has not yet experienced major problems with jurors undertaking 
independent research,185 and even in the UK research has found that “the overwhelming 
majority of jurors understand the rules and abide by them.”186 However, in light of our 
Law Commission’s work on contempt of court, and growing concerns around the use of 
the Internet, it is important that our law is equipped to deal with this problem should it 
arise. Research carried out in the UK has suggested that up to 23 per cent of jurors are 
“confused” about the rule that they should not use the Internet to conduct their own 
research, and at least seven per cent had researched online the case which they were 
deciding.187 There are also some reported cases in New Zealand of jurors undertaking 
their own investigations, as discussed earlier in this paper.  
 
It is also important to recognise that the degree of the problem cannot be accurately 
assessed as it may be very difficult to detect. There are two main reasons for this: the first 
is that where a juror undertakes research on a personal electronic device, the court will 
have no reasonable way of finding out about this. Even if the court orders jurors to 
surrender their electronic devices while they are present at court, there is nothing to stop 
them conducting their own research at home later. The second reason is that jury 
deliberations are confidential. This is mitigated somewhat by s 76(3) of the Evidence Act 
2006 which allows a person to give evidence about jury deliberations if the particular 
circumstances are sufficiently compelling, depending on the judge’s assessment of 
  
185 Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.13]. 
186  (13 March 2014) Public Bill Committee Debate GBPD HC 125, per Professor Cheryl Thomas. 
187 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [3.29]. 
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balance, between the public interest in confidentiality and the public interest in ensuring 
justice is done.188 In R v Young, where four jurors met in the hotel where they were 
staying to conduct their deliberations, and consulted a ouija board to contact a murder 
victim to ask who had killed them, the Judges were concerned about whether it was 
legitimate for them to consider what the jury had done during their period of 
sequestration at the hotel room.189 While they decided that the time the jury spent at the 
hotel was break time, rather than technically part of their deliberations, so was open to 
judicial scrutiny and comment, this does illustrate the potential difficulties that could 
arise with judges interfering with jury deliberations.190  
 
The difficulties in conducting research into juror behaviour, and the uncertain degree of 
the problem, should cause policy-makers to be cautious about the issue of jurors 
undertaking independent research. Because of the difficulties in detecting misconduct, 
and because most research into juror behaviour relies on self-reporting,191 there are 
probably more cases of jurors undertaking their own research than are reported. It is 
important therefore to consider how the law could best be adapted to resolve this 
problem. 
A The Law Should Focus on Preventing Jurors Undertaking Their Own Research 
 
The focus of this aspect of the contempt jurisdiction to date has largely been on 
publishers – we aim to prevent publication of prejudicial information rather than putting 
the onus on jurors to avoid coming into contact with that information. However, this is 
flawed for several reasons. First, a focus on publication contempt limits the publishers’ 
right to impart, and the public’s right to receive information to a far greater extent than a 
ban on juror research would. There may be a legitimate public interest in knowing about 
certain trials, and being able to debate issues arising from those trials.192 The nebulous 
  
188 Evidence Act 2006, s76(3)-(4). 
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nature of the “real risk” test may have a chilling effect on publication beyond what the 
scope of the law is in fact, meaning that the public is not privy to vast amounts of 
information that technically could be published. An example of this may be where a 
newspaper wishes to publish a general comment on an area of the law or a type of 
offence, but is deterred from doing so because there is a pending or current trial where 
that area of law is being applied. If we focused more on preventing jurors accessing 
information, then we might be able to relax the law relating to publication contempt to 
some degree. This would allow greater freedom of expression for the media and greater 
access to information for the general public. 
 
Secondly, there are types of information that are unrelated to the types of prejudicial 
information that may be published by the media but that, if accessed by jurors, may 
undermine the administration of justice. For example, a juror may prejudice the 
administration of justice by looking up definitions of legal terms, or by accessing 
inaccurate information inadvertently. The Law Commission gives the example of a juror 
googling a defendant with a relatively common name, such as “David Smith”, and 
finding information about another person by the same name.193 Finally, if it is found that 
a juror has broken the rules and accessed extraneous material, the trial may have to be 
aborted. Where this leads to a retrial,194 significant costs are incurred, and much time is 
taken up, which also has an impact on witnesses and victims who must go through the 
trial process once again.195 In each of these circumstances, public confidence in the 
administration of justice and the jury system may be adversely affected.196 The possibility 
of victims and other witnesses having to go through the trial process all over again is 
significant, given the high proportion of jury trials that involve sexual offending.197 
 
  
193  Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.20]. 
194 See, for example, R v Tainui [2008] NZCA 119; Neale v R [2010] NZCA 167. 
195  Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.21]. 
196  At [5.22]. 
197 Ministry of Justice Improvements to Sexual Violence Legislation in New Zealand – Discussion 
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Finally, limiting jurors’ rights to undertake their own research is more directly focused on 
the harm in question: that of juror prejudice. 198 Some research has suggested that the 
extent to which exposure to prejudicial information actually undermines jurors’ 
impartiality is minimal.199 The fact that judges routinely give directions to juries to 
disregard evidence offered that turns out to be inadmissible, or to avoid placing too much 
weight on particular pieces of evidence, suggests that our system places a reasonable 
degree of trust in the jury to follow instructions and use evidence appropriately in 
reaching their verdicts.200 However, there is a greater risk of prejudice or inappropriate 
use of information not in evidence where a juror actually seeks out the information 
themselves. The fact that a juror has gone to the effort of searching for information to aid 
or supplement his or her understanding would suggest that her or she intended to make 
use of this information in reaching their verdict. Thus the law’s interest in preventing 
jurors from undertaking their own research is stronger than its interest in limiting 
publication. 
 
On a practical level, it is also proving far more difficult nowadays to control the media, as 
the Internet “allows anyone to be a publisher”,201 and many modern forms of media such 
as blogs may not adhere to strict media law or guidelines for publication, and may be less 
scrupulous about publishing prejudicial or inaccurate information. The proliferation of 
online fora where information can be imparted also means the courts may not be aware of 
prejudicial information that is published, and may be unable to prevent certain 
information being imparted. While this should not mean that the modern media is given 
absolute freedom to publish, it does bring into focus the need for the law to improve other 
types of measures designed at preventing juror prejudice.  
 
Of course, a focus on juror research should not mean that there are no restrictions on 
publication whatsoever. There are two reasons for this: first, that information about a trial 
or an accused person may be published prior to a jury being empanelled, but may be 
  
198  Law Commission of England and Wales above n 134, at [3.12]. 
199  Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials, above n 184, at 175. 
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highly prejudicial; secondly, there is still a risk that jurors will accidentally access 
prejudicial information during the course of the trial. I do not argue in this paper that the 
offence of jurors undertaking their own research should be strict liability in nature – that 
would constitute too great a limit on their ability to use information and communications 
technology and it would be arguably too harsh to impose a punishment on jurors who 
accidentally access information, especially given that many people view jury service as 
an unwanted imposition into their lives already.  
 
Judges and commentators acknowledge that jurors are not “blank slates” and that they 
bring a wealth of personal experience and knowledge with them to their task. Part of the 
rationale for having juries is that they bring together a range of views from a cross-
section of the community.202 It is implicit in this that we expect jurors to put their life 
experience and capabilities to use in performing their role. It has also been acknowledged 
that it would be virtually impossible, or at least “unrealistic” to expect to be able to 
empanel a jury in which no one was aware of any prejudicial publicity or background 
information to the case.203 Thus the objective of the law should be to mitigate any 
prejudice arising from information accessed either before the trial, or accessed by 
accident during a trial, rather than to prevent access to that information.  
 
There are a number of options that could be explored to address this concern about 
prejudicial publicity. One is to require jurors to inform a judge if they accidentally come 
across external information relating to the case during their term of jury service. For 
example, if a juror came across an article or opinion posted by one of their friends on a 
social media site, they may have become privy to prejudicial information unintentionally. 
Requiring them to inform the judge would necessarily require them to form some 
appreciation of the risk that such information may affect their ability to be impartial. If 
they have acknowledged the potential that they may be influenced by this information, 
and that any such influence would be improper, then they are likely to be wary of using 
that information in their deliberations. The judge would also be able to assess whether the 
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information was of such a degree of prejudice that a mistrial ought to be ordered, or 
whether an appropriate judicial direction would suffice. 
 
There will inevitably be some information that is so prejudicial that it is not worth the 
risk to the administration of justice to allow its publication. For example, publishing 
information about a person’s previous convictions, where that information has been 
found inadmissible at trial because its unfair prejudicial effect is not outweighed by its 
probative value, should not be published in the lead-up to, or during, a trial.204 The 
recommendation I make in this paper is not that there should be no limitations on 
publication whatsoever, but that publication freedom could be widened, improving the 
media and the general public’s rights to freedom of expression, if there was a greater 
focus on juror misconduct. It will be open to the courts or the legislature to adopt lesser 
controls on publication, thus limiting the chilling effect and uncertainty of the law, if the 
instance of jurors undertaking their own research is curtailed.  
B Statutory Criminalisation of Independent Juror Research 
 
In the light of the importance of an accused’s right to a fair trial, and of the public’s 
confidence in the administration of justice, it does seem that statutory criminalisation of 
independent research by jurors would constitute a justifiable limit on the right to freedom 
of expression in terms of section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. It would be a 
temporary and clearly-defined limitation that does not infringe on the right to any 
significant degree more than the current law of contempt. While there may be less 
punitive alternatives available, such as improving juror education, the common law 
already seems to prohibit this type of conduct, so there need be no additional impact on 
freedom of expression. In fact it is better that such conduct is subject to a clear statutory 
offence rather than judicial discretion. If New Zealand chooses to adopt a similar 
provision it should be combined with more proactive initiatives to aid jurors’ 
understanding of the law and its purpose in order to encourage compliance. 
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I argue that a provision along the lines of the UK Bill would be justified in New Zealand 
because it is narrow and does not impose a much greater limit on the right to freedom of 
expression than the common law currently does. In fact it may actually result in a lesser 
practical limitation on freedom of expression, because it is clearly-defined so as to 
minimise any chilling effect that currently arises from uncertainty in the law. The 
limitation on jurors’ rights to seek and receive information imposed by this measure is 
not significant. First, the statutory provision is worded in such a way as to limit the right 
to seek specific types of information relating to the proceedings. Secondly, the limit to 
the right to seek information is imposed for a defined and finite period of time. The 
limitation begins once a person is sworn in as a member of a jury, and concludes when 
the jury is discharged.205 Outside those times the person is free to seek whatever 
information they wish to. It is also worth noting here that certain other infringements on 
the right to freedom of expression are imposed on jurors that are more onerous and long-
lasting than this, but are still considered justifiable – for example, jury deliberations being 
secret.206 Thirdly, as noted above, the necessary mens rea is intention, so jurors who 
receive information without the relevant intention will not have committed an offence.  
 
The changes in technology and social circumstances justify the introduction of a new 
statutory offence. Moreover, the creation of a statutory offence is likely to have an 
educative and a deterrent effect, which would further these important objectives. The 
only aspect of the UK Bill that would be out of proportion in New Zealand is the two-
year sentence of imprisonment; if a similar provision was to be adopted here it would be 
likely that the maximum penalty would be three months imprisonment, to ensure it was in 
proportion with other contempt-type offences.207  
 
However, there are some problems with the UK Bill in that certain aspects that make the 
provision less objectionable from a freedom of expression perspective may also limit its 
efficacy. For example, the offence is limited to where a juror “intentionally” seeks 
information. While this may be justified in that criminal penalties should not be imposed 
  
205  Juries Act 1974, s 20A(5), as proposed by Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2013-2014, cl 42(3). 
206 Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd above n 11, at 55. 
207  See Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 365 (2)(b)(i). 
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lightly and where no relevant mens rea exists, it removes any onus on jurors to take 
active steps to avoid being exposed to certain information, so that they may still scroll 
through news websites, for example, and not be caught by the provision.208 The fact that 
the provision poses an objective standard for knowing that information sought is relevant 
to the trial goes some way to ameliorating this issue, as it means that a juror cannot plead 
ignorance of the fact that a particular definition, for example, is relevant.209 The Law 
Commission for England and Wales has also noted that although the provision is likely to 
have a strong deterrent effect, there will still be some sworn jurors who will fail to 
comply, and so removal of prejudicial publications from the Internet will also be 
necessary.210 
C Other Measures to Discourage Jurors From Undertaking Their Own Research 
 
The New Zealand Law Commission has demonstrated a preference for more educative 
measures, rather than the introduction of a statutory offence.211 The limit each option 
imposes on jurors’ rights to freedom of expression is comparable, but these options are 
less punitive. Nevertheless, it recommended a statutory offence to deal with cases where 
jurors conduct their own research in the face of clear, unequivocal, directions to refrain 
from doing so.212 I would similarly suggest that a range of non-punitive measures be 
introduced in order to minimise juror research.  
 
First and foremost, measures aimed at improving jurors’ understanding of the importance 
of not conducting their own research ought to be adopted. These may include more 
comprehensive, standardised judicial directions as to precisely what forms of conduct are 
prohibited, and the reasons for this. An explanation of the importance of an accused’s 
right to a fair trial, the problems with using information that was not subject to evidential 
inquiries and cross-examination, as well as of some of the additional harms, such as the 
  
208  Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [3.10]. 
209  Juries Act 1974 (UK), s 20A(2)(b), as proposed by Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2013-2014, cl 
42(3). 
210  Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 134, at [2.124]. 
211  Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.55]. 
212  At [5.56]. 
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impact on witnesses if they have to go through the trial process again, may also help in 
this endeavour. The juror oath should also be amended to exclude more explicitly jurors 
undertaking their own research. 
 
The second general area of reform measures should focus on addressing the reasons why 
jurors may currently feel the need to undertake their own research. It is suggested that 
jurors who undertake their own research into a case do so because they feel they are not 
being given enough information to decide, or because the information is presented to 
them in a confusing manner.213 We should not be surprised, then, if a generation of 
Internet-savvy jurors sees a Google search as the best and most obvious way to resolve 
any confusion. Specific measures that should be adopted include making it easier for 
jurors to ask questions during a trial, and providing better access to information about 
elements of the offence and the court process.214 One option would be to provide for the 
use of computers or tablets with locked applications to provide limited information such 
as definitions of offences, to which jurors can refer. It is suggested that this would be 
more effective than hard copies of information, as jurors may find it less helpful to sort 
through large volumes of paper material. 
 
Making jurors aware of the importance of not undertaking their own research, and 
limiting any perceived need on their part to do so, is likely to have the greatest effect on 
independent juror research. This is important also because of the difficulty in detecting 
when a juror has undertaken their own investigations. A criminal offence is likely to be 
little-used in practice, but combined with educational measures it is likely to have a 
strong deterrent effect, thus promoting greater protection of the administration of justice. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
In this I paper have considered the status of the contempt jurisdiction in New Zealand and 
the issues posed by the development of modern communications technology, as well as 
  
213 At [5.44]; Jacquline Horan, above n 162, at 198. 
214 Law Commission, above n 20, at [5.43]-[5.44]. 
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suggesting options for reform. The law on contempt of court has the potential to infringe 
severely on the right to freedom of expression. However, the right to a fair trial is 
considered to be absolute, and it may be severely undermined where prejudicial 
information is published on social media or where jurors undertake independent research. 
The law must adapt to meet the challenges of the social media age. Each of the options 
discussed has advantages as well as disadvantages, in terms of both efficacy and impact 
on rights. There is one school of thought that it is impossible for the law to preserve the 
integrity of criminal trials, as there will always be methods to circumvent the law using 
modern media.215 However, given the impact that juror research or jurors being 
influenced by the media can have on a trial, it is important that the law finds some 
strategy to deal with modern technology. 
 
In this paper I have highlighted the importance of focusing not just on those who wish to 
publish information, but on jurors who may be in contempt if they seek out information 
relevant to a trial. Much of the scholarship to date has focused solely on the freedom of 
expression rights of publishers. This is unfortunate: while I do not suggest that there 
should be no limits on publication, I have argued that there should be a greater relative 
limit on the freedom of expression rights of jurors to seek information, than on the rights 
of publishers to impart information about trials and those of the public to receive it. The 
harm that both juror misconduct and publication contempts are seeking to address is that 
of juror prejudice. Focusing on preventing jurors from accessing prejudicial information 
is thus more directly targeting the problem. Further, there is the potential for jurors to 
gain inaccurate understandings of the law from undertaking their own research.  
 
I have recommended that the best approach to reforming the law of contempt is to begin 
with codification of specific forms of contempt. In this paper I have focused on 
codification of the offence of jurors undertaking their own research, and argued that the 
UK Criminal Justice and Courts Bill strikes an appropriate balance between limiting 
jurors’ freedom to seek information, and protecting the right to a fair trial. There are a 
number of benefits to statutory criminalisation: most significantly, there is scope for 
  
215 See Smith, above n 14, at 23. 
50  
 
much greater clarity in the law if it is codified, and jurors are likely to have a greater 
appreciation of the importance of not conducting their own research if it is included in a 
criminal statute – the corollary is that judges can point to the criminal provision to back 
up their direction to the jury not to undertake their own research. 
 
The second broad recommendation I have made in this paper relates to more educative 
measures, aimed at limiting the motivations for jurors to undertake their own research. In 
particular, measures that will promote greater juror understanding of the importance of 
not using external information, and measures that will improve the trial process so that 
jurors do not feel a need to undertake their own research, such as better judicial 
directions, amending the juror oath to reflect the importance of not looking outside the 
evidence, greater use of information technology and interactions with jurors, and 
potentially adopting a more interactive approach to empanelling jurors in some case, will 
be necessary. This is important because of the difficulty in detecting juror research using 
modern technology. I suggest that the law will be most effective where jurors understand 
the reasons for not undertaking their own research and where they feel that they are 
receiving adequate information during the trial so that there is no need for them to make 
further inquiries. Statutory criminalisation will have a role to play in educating jurors, but 
a combination of the other measures I have identified will also be necessary if the law is 
to meet the challenges of contemporary information and communications technology, and 
continue to uphold the right to a fair trial.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count 
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      Appendix: Criminal Justice and Courts Bill (UK) (extract) 
 
20A Offence: research by jurors 
(1) It is an offence for a member of a jury that tries an issue in a case before a court to 
research the case during the trial period, subject to the exceptions in subsections (6) 
and (7). 
(2) A person researches a case if (and only if) the person— 
       (a) intentionally seeks information, and 
       (b) when doing so, knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is or may 
be relevant to the case. 
(3) The ways in which a person may seek information include— 
       (a) asking a question, 
       (b) searching an electronic database, including by means of the Internet, 
       (c) visiting or inspecting a place or object, 
       (d) conducting an experiment, and 
       (e) asking another person to seek the information. 
(4) Information relevant to the case includes information about— 
       (a) a person involved in events relevant to the case, 
       (b) the judge dealing with the issue, 
       (c) any other person involved in the trial, whether as a lawyer, a witness or otherwise, 
       (d) the law relating to the case, 
       (e) the law of evidence, and 
       (f) court procedure. 
(5) “The trial period”, in relation to a member of a jury that tries an issue, is the period— 
       (a) beginning when the person is sworn to try the issue, and 
       (b) ending when the judge discharges the jury or, if earlier, when the judge 
discharges the person. 
(6) It is not an offence under this section for a person to seek information if the person 
needs the information for a reason which is not connected with the case. 
(7) It is not an offence under this section for a person— 
       (a) to attend proceedings before the court on the issue; 
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       (b) to seek information from the judge dealing with the issue; 
       (c)   to do anything which the judge dealing with the issue directs or authorises the 
person to do; 
       (d) to seek information from another member of the jury, unless the person knows or 
ought reasonably to know that the other member of the jury contravened this 
section in the process of obtaining the information; 
       (e) to do anything else which is reasonably necessary in order for the jury to try the 
issue. 
(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both). 
(9) Proceedings for an offence under this section may only be instituted by or with the 
consent of the Attorney General. 
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